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The conscious mind is that piece of reality in which the world experiences itself so that it is not possible to develop a theory of consciousness which isn't, at the same time, also a theory of reality.
The essential properties of conscious experience are i) having/being a unity, ii) the capability of representing, and iii) the capability of referring to. None of these three properties is part of the objective reductionistic framework typical of physicalism. Nevertheless, these three properties are an empirical fact that must be fully understood and a new ontological scheme must be developed (Chalmers, 1996; Davidson, 1980; Praetorius, 1999; Whitehead, 1925, 1927). According to Leopold Stubenberg's principle of phenomenological adequacy a new ontological scheme must be proposed (Stubenberg, 1998) in order to explain such subjective and phenomenal facts that were explicitly rejected by the Galilean revolution.
To accomplish this goal, we propose to refute the classical distinction between ontology (what there is), phenomenology (the domain of subjective mental experience), and epistemology (the domain of knowledge and relation between entities). The fundamental block of reality is no longer seen as a physical chunk of matter with no semantic properties, no unity and no qualitative aspects. In the same way as the photon is the underlying principle constituting both the appearance of waves and of particles, we argue that - since being, representation and being in relation-with cannot be split - they must be the manifestation of something more fundamental. We propose to call it 'onphene' - a new word that is the compound of ontos, phenomenon and epistemé. The three fundamental aspects, namely being (that produces unity), representation and being in relation-with, correspond to different combinations of the 'onphene' (Manzotti, 2001; Manzotti and Tagliasco, 2000, 2001).
On the basis of this hypothesis, a definition for the conscious mind is advanced since the ontological framework proposed endorses the semantic aspects of reality. The conscious subject is an occurrence of 'onphenes' that possesses its own unity. Since the proposed ontology explains events as a product of the 'onphenes', and objects as a product of events (as Donald Davidson put it (Davidson, 1980)), the unity of a conscious subject is explained by the relations between events.
The criteria that must be used to test such a theory are three: i)
experiential adequacy, ii) ontological economy, and iii) compatibility with
objective science. For instance Cartesian dualism satisfies the first two
criteria but not the third one. On the other hand physicalism only complies with the
last two criteria, while functionalism only fits the last. The Theory we propose
(the Theory of the Enlarged Mind, TEM for short) satisfies all three criteria.
It explains the properties of first person experience (having content, being
representation, having semantic properties, being unity). TEM is ontologically
simple since it uses one single ontological principle. However, its
compatibility with objective science must be pursued and tested: if the theory
predicts the appearance, content and nature of conscious experience in human
beings; or if it deals with the design of an artificial mind.
Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The Conscious Mind: in Search of a Fundamental
Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Manzotti, R. (2001). Intentional robots. The design of a goal seeking,
environment driven, agent. PhD Thesis, University of Genoa, Genova.
Manzotti, R., and Tagliasco, V. (2000). Intentionalizing nature. Proceedings of
Tucson 2000, Tucson.
Manzotti, R., and Tagliasco, V. (2001). Coscienza e Realtà. Una teoria della
coscienza per costruttori e studiosi di menti e cervelli. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Praetorius, N. (1999). Principles of Cognition, Language and Action: Essays on
the Foundations of a Science of Psychology. New York: Kluwer Academic Press.
Stubenberg, L. (1998). Consciousness and qualia. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins Pub.
Whitehead, A. N. (1925). Science and the modern world. New York: Free Press.
Whitehead, A. N. (1927). Process and Reality. London: The Free Press.